



The European Economic Advisory Group was estab-
lished in 2001 and produced its first report on the
European economy in 2002. This report is thus the
sixth one of the group. Like that of last year, the
report consists of two parts: one dealing with short-
term macroeconomic issues and the other with
longer-term ones.
The first part of the report contains three chapters. 
• Chapter 1 provides a macroeconomic outlook and
discusses fiscal and monetary policy options for
the euro area. The forecast is one of a mild slow-
down in the world economy and a slower – but
continued – recovery in the European economy.
The need for further fiscal consolidation in the EU
countries and for a restructuring of government
expenditures in favour of government investment,
R&D and education is stressed. A special section
analyses how well the common monetary policy
has fitted individual countries. The upshot is that
there are considerable stabilisation policy costs
which have not fallen over time.
• Chapter 2 analyses macroeconomic adjustment
within the euro area. The focus is on the adjust-
ment problems in Ireland (which has had a boom-
ing economy) and Italy (which has instead been
exposed to strong contractionary shocks). The
analysis stresses how adjustment processes may be
much more complex than was believed earlier. One
reason is asset price dynamics. Another is that sup-
ply-side adjustment mechanisms, such as labour
migration, may also have demand effects. A key
conclusion is that deregulations that enhance pro-
ductivity growth may be a key adjustment mecha-
nism in the medium term for a country – like Italy
– that needs to improve its competitiveness.
• Chapter 3 examines how well the ten member
states that entered the EU in 2004 have been doing.
It is a follow-up of earlier extensive analyses in our
2004 report. The finding is that the growth perfor-
mance of the EU-10 has been very good in gener-
al. The chapter warns about the dangers of keep-
ing those countries that have entered the ERM II
outside the monetary union and proposes a rebate
with respect to the inflation criterion for joining
the euro for fast-growing countries that are catch-
ing up with the old EU countries. The chapter also
assesses the current economic situation of Bulgaria
and Romania, who acceded to the EU on 1 Janu-
ary this year. 
Much of the European policy debate is about what
economic model Europe should opt for. The issue is
often cast as a choice between a market-liberal,
Anglo-Saxon model, providing economic efficiency at
the cost of low social protection, and a social Euro-
pean model, delivering equity but at a high cost in
terms of efficiency. Chapters 4 to 6 provide in-depth
analyses of various aspects of this choice.
• Chapter 4 looks in detail at the macroeconomic
performance of Denmark, Finland and Sweden.
Finland and Sweden have achieved high output
growth but less satisfactory employment growth.
Denmark has been less successful in terms of out-
put growth, but labour market performance has
been impressive. The question is whether the
Scandinavian economic model represents a role
model for the rest of Europe that is able to com-
bine economic efficiency with social justice. The
conclusion is that the Scandinavian experiences
show that an improvement of macroeconomic per-
formance in European countries requires market-
liberal reforms, but that already limited reforms
can produce significant results, still leaving in place
a system very different from the Anglo-Saxon ones.
• Chapter 5 analyses corporate taxation within the
EU and asks whether the new EU states expose the
old ones to unfair tax competition. Various policy
approaches are discussed. The chapter recommends
an increase in VAT and a reduction in labour
income taxes as a way of “simulating” an efficient
destination-based tax on corporate profits.
• Chapter 6 provides an in-depth analysis of the phe-
nomenon of economic nationalism, as practiced
by many governments in the EU, for example in the
form of opposition to cross-border mergers, pro-
motion of national champions and bailing out ofdomestic firms. Even though such measures usual-
ly are very inefficient ways of achieving national
objectives, they still have been employed. The
chapter finds public ownership – both full and par-
tial – of firms to be a key factor behind harmful
nationalistic interventions in the economy. The
best way to deal with economic nationalism would
be to severely restrict the degree of public owner-
ship. Coordinated deregulation across the EU may
also be a necessary prerequisite for countries to
deregulate sufficiently.
Chapter 1: Macroeconomic outlook and policy
With a growth rate of 5.1 percent for world GDP,
the world economy expanded almost as fast in 2006
as in 2004, the year of the highest growth since 1973.
Especially the integration of fast growing, emerging
economies like China, India, Russia and Eastern
Europe into the world trading system has brought
this about. High profits, booming asset markets and
low long-term interest rates were also important
contributing factors. The oil price increases during
the first part of 2006 restrained growth only mar-
ginally. 
The world economy has just surpassed its peak and
will decelerate somewhat during the next few months.
Most likely, the slowdown will be temporary and
modest: we expect a world economic growth of slight-
ly below 5 percent both this and next year. 
In 2006, economic dynamism shifted from the US
towards Europe. After approximately three years of
high growth, the US economy started to cool down
markedly last year. A key factor is falling residential
construction. Partly due to the real depreciation of
the dollar, US economic growth will begin to speed up
again from the second half of 2007. After growth of
3.4 percent last year, GDP will grow by 2.5 percent in
2007 and 2.8 percent in 2008. The current account
deficit will shrink slowly, after having increased to
6.6 percent of GDP last year.
In Japan, a reduction in private consumption was
not fully compensated by stronger investment and
export performances in 2006 and led to a slower
pace of recovery than in 2005. Private consumption
will pick up again in 2007, mainly due to increased
firm profits and a tightening of the labour market.
On the other hand, the slowdown in the world econ-
omy will initially reduce export growth and invest-
ment. Also, reinforced fiscal consolidation efforts
will result in a negative growth contribution from
public spending. Overall, GDP will grow at 2.0 per-
cent this year and 2.2 percent in 2008. In July 2006,
the Bank of Japan made its first interest rate move
since September 2001 and thereby signalled its
intention to normalise monetary policy. Moderate
inflation will allow the bank to continue its course
of gradually making monetary policy less expan-
sionary.
The Chinese economy continues to grow very dynam-
ically at rates around 10 percent per year. The objec-
tive of the government to decrease income disparity
between rural and urban areas and the strong rise in
retail trade sales suggest that the increases in private
consumption will be able to compensate for the some-
what lower export growth. So far, there are no signs
that the Chinese economy is overheating. Inflation
rates will continue to stay between 1 and 2 percent.
During the past year, there was only a small apprecia-
tion of the renminbi, by slightly more than 3 percent,
against the US dollar. Therefore, foreign exchange
reserves continued to increase further, making China
the country with the largest foreign exchange reserves
in the world. 
Developments in Europe
The economic recovery in the EU continued to gath-
er pace last year. With a rate of 2.9 percent in 2006,
the EU recorded the highest GDP growth since 2000.
Growth was somewhat weaker in the second half of
the year. Aggregate output in the EU is expected to
grow by 2.2 percent in 2007 and 2.5 percent in 2008.
The growth gap between Europe and Japan, on the
one hand, and the US, on the other, will almost dis-
appear this year, basically because growth in the US
will decelerate significantly.
The recovery in the European economy in 2006 was
largely driven by domestic demand. Private consump-
tion increased notably almost everywhere. Improved
labour market conditions and higher wages were the
main causes. Another important factor behind
demand growth last year was private investment.
However, the somewhat weaker outlook for the world
economy had some negative effects on the propensity
to invest during the second half of last year.
Therefore, we expect investment in the EU to grow at
a somewhat more moderate pace of approximately




Not only investment, but also foreign demand in the
EU developed somewhat weaker in the second than in
the first half of 2006. This development will continue
during the first part of 2007 with the consequence
that net exports will contribute negatively to GDP
growth this year. In 2008, the stronger world economy
will reverse this. 
Higher employment growth during especially the first
half of 2006 caused the unemployment rate in the EU
to fall to 7.9 percent in 2006. Over the coming two
years, the labour market situation will improve fur-
ther, albeit at a considerably slower pace.
As the output gap closed, upholding the wage mod-
eration that has characterised many European coun-
tries in the past few years became more difficult in
2006. Nevertheless, an average nominal wage in-
crease in the euro area of 1.9 percent last year was
still moderate. 
Despite further increases in the oil price in the first
half of last year, no significant inflation pressure
arose. Consumer prices rose by 2.2 percent in 2006.
With inflation rates of 2.2 and 1.9 percent in 2007 and
2008, price increases in the EU will also remain mod-
erate. The higher inflation in 2007 than in 2008 can be
explained by the German VAT increase, which will
contribute 1/4 percentage points to inflation in the EU
this year.
Fiscal policy
Business cycle developments have supplied the tail-
wind for fiscal consolidation in many European coun-
tries. Nevertheless, the overall fiscal deficit of the EU
states as a share of GDP fell by only 0.3 percentage
points last year and a further reduction of only
0.4 percentage points is forecasted for this year, bring-
ing it down to 1.6 percent of GDP. Whereas last year
the entire deficit reduction was due to the working of
automatic stabilisers, that is increased tax revenues
and lower social security spending caused by
improved income and labour market conditions, this
year two thirds of the reduction reflects structural
improvements. 
Given the future budget pressures from demographic
developments, the current reductions in budget
deficits are clearly insufficient. The still relaxed atti-
tude of politicians towards the long-run fiscal situa-
tion in Europe continues to be worrying. Indeed, the
cyclical improvement in fiscal positions in many coun-
tries that is now occurring is potentially dangerous,
because it may create the illusion that fiscal problems
have been overcome and that the revised stability pact
is working. There is a large risk that past experiences
of insufficient tightening of fiscal policy in upswings
are repeated, which will have grave consequences in
the next downturn. We recommend that the current
cyclical upswing be used for larger fiscal consolidation
than is now occurring. 
To further economic growth in the long run, govern-
ments should reallocate spending to those areas that
foster growth, like infrastructure, R&D investment
and education. The ten-year Lisbon Strategy – initiat-
ed in 2000 –focuses on research and education. With
only three years to go until 2010, Europe still is far off
its 3 percent of GDP target for R&D spending. With
only around 1.9 percent of GDP, R&D spending
stood at virtually the same level in 2005 as in 2000.
Also education expenditures in the euro area have
basically stagnated since 1999. Although the EU
countries should not follow any uniform growth strat-
egy, it is clear that at present levels of R&D spending
even the more developed part of the EU will not be
able to reach the aspired international technology
frontiers. 
Monetary policy
Since December 2005 the ECB has increased its
main refinancing rate in six steps by 1.5 percentage
points to a level of 3.5 percent at the end of last
year. This, together with an appreciation of around
10 percent of the euro against the dollar, implied
more restrictive monetary conditions in the euro
area last year. A likely continuing appreciation of
the euro, a steady decline in inflation and increasing
real interest rates will make overall monetary condi-
tions in the euro area in 2007 even less accommoda-
tive than last year. 
Not only were monetary conditions in the euro area
at the end of last year as restrictive as they have
ever been. Also an estimated reaction function of
the ECB (a forward-looking Taylor rule) indicates
that the actual interest rate is somewhat above tar-
get at the moment. Therefore, further increases in
the ECB interest rate would not be in line with the
bank’s past behaviour. For this reason, we have
assumed that the ECB will opt for an interest-rate
pause, leaving the main refinancing rate at 3.5 per-
cent during 2007 and 2008. But, given the current
pronouncements of the bank, additional interestrate rises are possible, although only higher infla-
tion than earlier expected or stronger macroeco-
nomic developments would justify such a policy. On
the other hand, if there were to be stronger fiscal
consolidation efforts, this could create room for
lower interest rates.
The cost for member countries of the common mon-
etary policy is often discussed. It implies almost by
definition that not all member countries are pleased
with the course being followed. We provide stress
indicators, whose evolution over time provides infor-
mation on the adequacy of the single monetary pol-
icy for each of the EMU member countries. Stress in
a particular member country is defined as the differ-
ence between the actual short-term interest rate and
the interest rate that would prevail if that country
was able to follow an “optimal” monetary policy.
We argue that the actual reaction function of the
ECB would be a good description of “optimal”
monetary policy at the country level provided that
the interest rate could react to country-specific devi-
ations of inflation from the ECB target and coun-
try-specific output gaps. Asymmetries in inflation
and cyclical output developments across countries
will generate differences between the actual interest
rate and the interest rate that would be set if the
reaction function of the ECB were applied on the
national level. 
There is no clear trend in absolute stress levels over
time, suggesting that there has not been a steady
increase in the degree of business cycle synchronisa-
tion over the past eight years. This speaks against the
argument that the monetary union would automati-
cally reduce differences in cyclical developments
among the member countries. But this does not mean
that stress levels are constant over time. In particular
during 2003 and in the summer of 2005, stress levels
were particularly high in the euro area. 
From the perspective of an individual country,
Ireland in particular is noteworthy. This country
shows the highest levels of overall stress, and optimal
interest rates would have been considerably higher.
On the other hand, the low inflation in Germany
would have motivated lower interest rates there if the
country had been able to set its own interest rate. 
From a European perspective, it appears that policy
weights attached by the ECB to developments in the
large countries, and in particular to Germany, are
lower than would be suggested by their economic size.
On the other hand, developments in small member
countries appear to have received more than propor-
tional weights in the monetary policy decisions of the
ECB.
Chapter 2: Macroeconomic adjustment in the euro
area – the cases of Ireland and Italy
A key issue in the debate about monetary union has
concerned how individual economies adjust to coun-
try-specific shocks. This chapter takes a closer look at
the experiences during the first years with the euro.
The analysis focuses on Ireland and Italy. Ireland pro-
vides a case study of excessive monetary stimulus.
Italy, in contrast, is an example of recessionary
shocks from a fall in external demand and adverse
productivity developments. 
The adjustment problem arises from the presence of
nominal and real rigidities that hamper efficient
movements in relative prices. If prices and wages were
sufficiently flexible, a positive demand shock in one
country and a negative one in another would lead to
a relative price change: The real exchange rate of the
former country vis-à-vis the latter would appreciate,
so as to keep employment and output at their natural
rates in both countries. With frictions, the short-run
responses are instead inefficient output and employ-
ment changes as well as misalignment of relative
prices. 
The adjustment problem stems from the fact that
equilibrating movements of prices and the real
exchange rate occur only sluggishly over time. This
delayed response often causes additional macroeco-
nomic stress, because inflation persistence leads to
excessive real appreciation and overshooting of equi-
librium relative prices. Moreover, adjustment does not
work symmetrically: Real depreciation in response to
a negative shock is typically much slower than real
appreciation in the case of a positive shock, and often
fails to materialise with the necessary intensity for
many years.
This asymmetry implies a general lesson for the coun-
tries in the eurozone: the inherent dynamics of adjust-
ment creates a bias towards “competitiveness prob-
lems”. These are persistent when a country is hit by a
negative shock. In economies exposed to expansion-
ary shocks, such problems are likely to appear at the
end of booms, as excessive real appreciation may





In Ireland, labour costs have increased very rapidly in
the context of the expansionary monetary and fiscal
policy mix of the first years of the euro. So far, because
of the Irish specialisation in sectors where demand is
highly elastic to growth at the global level, the dynam-
ics of world GDP has prevented a deterioration in
export performance. But the strong appreciation of the
real exchange rate makes the country vulnerable to
changes in the global outlook, creating substantial
macroeconomic risk.
Ireland provides an example of how asset prices, espe-
cially housing prices, may play a much larger role in
the dynamics of adjustment in a monetary union than
was understood earlier. Through their impact on
housing prices, expansionary monetary conditions
can fuel sustained construction booms, which outlast
the initial demand shock, and contribute to a cumula-
tive process or real appreciation. In the Irish case, the
growth in the housing stock is to some extent a by-
product of the convergence process, as the
capital–labour ratio approaches the long-run equilib-
rium level. But the pace and intensity of housing
investment have arguably been amplified by monetary
stimulus. The strong expansion in the construction
sector and the high market valuation of real estate
clearly point to the risk of a significant reversal, which
could amplify the contractionary effects of real
appreciation once a downturn starts. 
The Irish case also raises the issue of whether adjust-
ment channels can work in “perverse“ ways and move
demand in the same direction as the shock. This point
has been emphasised early on by the so-called Walters
critique of the fixed exchange rates in the ERM. In
response to a demand boom, adjustment requires an
increase in the price level, although the process is usu-
ally delayed by nominal rigidities. This means that, in
the short run, expectations of higher inflation – and
thus a fall in the real interest rate – can further stimu-
late aggregate demand. As suggested by the Irish ex-
perience, similar considerations may apply to the
adjustment via labour migration. Immigration of
workers can contain labour shortages in booms,
reducing the pressure on wages and prices. Yet, new
migrants also increase aggregate expenditures and in
particular the demand for new housing.
Italy
In contrast to Ireland, Italy is suffering from sus-
tained contractionary shocks. There has been a fall in
external demand – associated with increased compe-
tition from emerging market economies in the “tradi-
tional“ sectors dominating the Italian economy –
which appears to have deepened after 2002. An
adjustment to these contractionary shocks would
require real depreciation. This has not happened.
Despite a severe slowdown of growth, real labour
costs have continued to increase faster than in other
eurozone countries. This, in combination with nega-
tive productivity growth, has caused a large increase
in Italy’s relative unit costs. The competitiveness
problem has been exacerbated by the strengthening
euro. 
The crisis has opened a deep divide between sectors
that are exposed to external competition and shel-
tered sectors, which have a much lesser incentive to
increase efficiency and lower costs. The problem is
that inefficiency and lack of competitive pricing in the
latter sectors translate into high costs of producing
and innovating for all firms in the economy. 
Demand policies are of limited use in the present cir-
cumstances. Fiscal policy faces a well-known policy
trade-off. A contractionary policy would help gain
competitiveness through disinflation but would exac-
erbate output and employment costs in the short run.
The Italian government is currently implementing a
small  internal devaluation through measures that
reduce the effective payroll tax rate on non-financial
firms (excluding public utilities) by approximately
3 percentage points. This is a step in the right direc-
tion, but it is clearly insufficient to address the com-
petitiveness crisis in Italy.
Other measures are likely to be more consequential.
In particular, the government could speed up deregu-
lation policies, reducing monopoly power in the sec-
tors of the economy least exposed to international
competition. An increase in efficiency and more com-
petitive pricing in these sectors would clearly have
large, beneficial effects on the sectors exposed to inter-
national competition. The recent experiences in the
Italian economy point to the need for reversing the
adverse productivity developments, not only to pro-
mote long-term growth but also to address the short-
run macroeconomic adjustment problems. The expe-
riences from the Scandinavian economies, which are
discussed in Chapter 4, show that deregulation poli-
cies can be quite effective in generating productivity
growth already in the medium term. A general lesson
seems to be that policies that work on the productivi-ty margin may be much more important also for
short-run adjustment than was realised earlier.
Chapter 3: The new EU members 
In the last three years, EU membership has grown by
twelve new countries. In May 2004, ten countries
joined and in January 2007 two more countries,
Bulgaria and Romania, became members. 
The foreign trade performance of the countries that
joined the EU in 2004 indicates increased integration
with the EU15 countries. Spurring of economic
growth has been a second benefit of EU member-
ship, with only Malta and Lithuania as possible
exceptions to the pattern. Labour market perfor-
mance has not, however, been as favourable to the
2004 entrants, as unemployment has fallen only in
the Baltic countries, Poland, Slovenia and the Slovak
Republic.
Membership in the monetary union
Joining the euro is a longer-term objective for the
2004 entrants. Only Slovenia has so far achieved this
goal, having entered the monetary union on 1 January
2007. Membership in the monetary union requires
fulfilment of several criteria of macroeconomic sta-
bility. These include price and exchange rate stability,
low fiscal deficits and government debt, and a low
long-term interest rate.
Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and the
Slovak Republic are currently in the ERM II, and
these countries are evidently slated to adopt the euro
relatively soon. Apart from inflation, the Baltic
countries and the Slovak Republic fulfil the criteria
for entry into the monetary union, although the lat-
ter country is a border-line case in terms of fiscal
deficits. Cyprus and Malta have some problems with
the fiscal criteria, and inflation in Malta is fluctuat-
ing and thus potentially problematic. Last year,
Lithuania’s application for membership in the mon-
etary union was turned down and Estonia was
advised not to apply. In both cases, too high inflation
(around four percent) was the reason for refusal of
membership.
The other 2004 entrants do not yet have definite plans
to enter the ERM II. Hence their membership in the
monetary union will be at least several years in the
future. Especially Hungary (with a deficit of around
ten percent of GDP in 2006) but also Poland have dif-
ficulties with the fiscal criteria. As regards long-term
interest rates, there are significant variations among
the 2004 entrants: Hungary clearly fails and Poland is
a border-line case. 
Strict application of the inflation criterion as a way to
postpone entry into the monetary union is creating a
potentially vulnerable situation for the Baltic states,
Cyprus, Malta, and the Slovak Republic. Requiring
both exchange rate stability and low inflation is, in gen-
eral, problematic because it sets two simultaneous tar-
gets for monetary policy. Moreover, the double require-
ment is particularly problematic for countries that are
experiencing rapid growth which raises inflation
through the Balassa-Samuelson effect. This effect
implies high inflation when high productivity growth in
the tradables sector causes high wage increases that spill
over to the non-tradables sector and result in substan-
tial price rises there. Given that these countries are
growing well, are integrating with the EU and fulfil, or
are not far from fulfilling, the EMU criteria apart from
inflation, they should be admitted quickly to the euro-
zone. As the formulation of the inflation criterion in the
Maastricht Treaty did not take the entry of fast-grow-
ing, catching-up countries into account, we propose
that a Balassa-Samuelson rebate of up to one percent-
age point should be added to the inflation criterion
when applied to the new member states. Alternatively,
one could move from using the inflation in the three EU
countries with the lowest inflation to using aggregate
euro area inflation as the norm of comparison. With
either formulation, both Lithuania and Estonia would
have been close to passing the test in 2006. 
The Eastern European 2004 entrants all have substan-
tial current account deficits. These are countered to
varying degrees by foreign direct investment, which
mainly originates from the euro area, Denmark and
Sweden. More generally, these countries have signifi-
cant net foreign liabilities, but the net liabilities take
mostly the form of equity liabilities. This reduces
short-term vulnerability. Various indicators also show
that the 2004 entrants are rapidly improving their
financial systems. Stock markets are growing in signif-
icance and banking systems are improving in terms of
efficiency and risk management. Nevertheless, past
experiences in a number of emerging economies with
exchange rate pegs have provided vivid illustrations of
the risk of capital flow reversals, when a period of
overheating and credit expansion associated with large
capital inflows has been followed by capital outflows




for making the ERM II period as short as possible for
the new EU member states.
Bulgaria and Romania
The two most recent EU entrants, Bulgaria and
Romania, are the poorest EU countries, with living
standards of around 60 percent of the average of the
eight Central and Eastern European countries.
However, Bulgaria and Romania have been growing
well in recent years, though Romanian growth has
exhibited substantial fluctuations. Inflation is a major
concern for both countries. The two countries have
high unemployment and low employment rates,
although Bulgarian unemployment has been falling
rapidly. With respect to public sector balances, Bul-
garia and Romania are doing reasonably well. Both
countries are, however, running significant current
account deficits. In terms of financial development
indicators, the financial sector in Bulgaria appears to
be roughly on a par with those of the 2004 entrants.
For Romania the values of these indicators are much
lower, which suggests that the financial sector in that
country is lagging behind those of the other new
member countries. 
EU membership is likely to bring significant benefits
to Bulgaria and Romania in the coming years, though
these countries must continue to reform their
economies. Overall, the medium-term prospects for
Bulgaria are likely to remain favourable, but a boom
in domestic credit and a high level of private external
debt could lead to a vulnerable situation, as Bulgaria
has a currency board arrangement. The medium-term
prospects for Romania appear fairly good. Fast cred-
it growth, however, has led to some concerns about
potential financial-sector and macroeconomic vulner-
ability. There are also signs of deteriorating competi-
tiveness due to an appreciation of the currency, strong
wage growth and unsatisfactory productivity develop-
ments. These concerns imply clear downside risks to
the basic medium-term scenario for Romania.
Chapter 4: Scandinavia today: An economic miracle?
In much of the recent European policy discussion,
there has been talk of a Scandinavian “economic mir-
acle”. The Scandinavian model has been hailed as a
role model for others to follow, as it has been perceived
to deliver high growth, high employment and macro-
economic stability, at the same time as a generous wel-
fare state provides a high level of social protection.
The chapter assesses macroeconomic developments in
Denmark, Finland and Sweden. The perception of
the Scandinavian economies in other European coun-
tries is often based on insufficient knowledge and too
rosy. But it is clear that Scandinavian macroeconom-
ic performance has recently been better than in many
eurozone countries, especially the large ones.
Output growth
In terms of output growth, Finland and Sweden have
been doing much better than most of the euro area
over the last decade. Denmark in contrast has not.
But the picture needs to be qualified. Part of the high
growth in Finland and Sweden has represented a
recovery from unusually deep demand-induced reces-
sions in the first half of the 1990s. Productivity
growth has, however, continued at high rates also in
recent years, which is in stark contrast to develop-
ments in the major euro area countries. Hence, struc-
tural factors must also have been at work. High pro-
ductivity growth seems linked to a larger focus on ICT
investment than in most other countries and to larger
contributions from both ICT-producing and ICT-
using sectors. A well-educated work force – which
because of capital-skill complementarity may have
made investment into ICT particularly profitable –
and high R&D spending are also likely to have been
of great importance.
High productivity growth in Finland and Sweden has
been associated with relative price declines for
exports, implying large terms of trade losses. If out-
put growth is corrected for this, real income develop-
ments in Finland and Sweden appear more normal as
compared to Continental European countries, and
Denmark is more on a par with the two other Scan-
dinavian countries we examine. The implication is
that a substantial fraction of the high output growth
in Finland and Sweden has benefited consumers else-
where.
There is considerable support for the hypothesis that
extensive deregulation in product and service markets
has been important for productivity growth in the
Scandinavian countries. The current level of regula-
tion is lower than in most euro area countries,
although not quite as low as in Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries. The change in the amount of regulation over the
last two decades has not been larger than in the euro
area, but deregulation steps were earlier and are there-
fore likely to have contributed more to productivity
growth in the past decade.Labour market developments
Employment rates (employment relative to working-
age population) in Denmark and Sweden are among
the highest in the OECD area and somewhat lower in
Finland (higher than in most euro area countries but
lower than in Anglo-Saxon countries). The largest
contributions to higher overall employment than in
the eurozone come from higher employment of
females and elderly. Denmark has also been successful
in achieving high youth employment. 
To understand the employment-generating capacity
of the Scandinavian model, one needs to see how dif-
ferent parts of the system interact. High and progres-
sive taxation discourages work in general, but also
finances generous childcare and makes it profitable to
split household income between two breadwinners.
Together with separate taxation and the absence of
dependent spouse deductions, this has promoted high
female employment. A fairly high degree of coordina-
tion of wage bargaining may also have helped restrain
wages despite high unionisation, high taxes and gen-
erous unemployment benefits.
Although the reductions in unemployment relative to
the peak years in the early 1990s have been substan-
tial in all three Scandinavian countries, only part of
the earlier unemployment rises have been recovered.
Denmark has been particularly successful in reducing
unemployment and raising employment. In much of
the European policy debate, this has been attributed
to the Danish flexicurity model, which combines low
employment protection, providing high flexibility,
with generous unemployment benefits, providing high
social protection. Emulating Danish flexicurity has
come to be a standard prescription for the Conti-
nental European countries. Unfortunately, the success
of this particular policy mix is largely a myth. There
is not much serious research suggesting that low
employment protection is a main cause of low unem-
ployment, but there is plenty of research suggesting
that generous unemployment insurance contributes to
high unemployment. What has occurred in Denmark
are significant reductions in the generosity of unem-
ployment benefits and increases in the requirements
on the unemployed. In contrast, there has not been
much change in employment protection: it remains
more or less the same as in the late 1970s and the
1980s when unemployment was very high.
The Scandinavian model is less successful in generat-
ing many hours worked than in generating high
employment rates. Total hours worked (at least as
reported) are higher than in most euro area countries
but significantly lower than in non-European OECD
countries like the US. In Sweden, this reflects to a
large extent high sickness absence, which rose when
unemployment fell in the late 1990s. This suggests
that there may be a substantial amount of concealed
unemployment in other social insurance systems.
Indeed, benefit dependency rates are high in the
Scandinavian countries and have not come down
much from the mid-1990s.
Policy lessons
Does the Scandinavian model represent a viable
alternative to the Anglo-Saxon model? It is true that
high employment and high output growth have been
achieved with much higher social protection than in
the Anglo-Saxon countries. A well-educated work
force is likely to have been an important contributing
factor. But it is also true that recent improvements in
macroeconomic performance in the Scandinavian
countries have been associated with limited – but yet
clear – steps in a market-liberal (Anglo-Saxon) direc-
tion. This is obvious in terms of product market
deregulations in all three Scandinavian countries.
Denmark is an example of how limited reductions in
benefit generosity can help reduce structural unem-
ployment very significantly. Sweden up till 2006 pro-
vides a contrast: the earlier absence of labour mar-
ket reforms was associated with more or less un-
changed structural unemployment. This may explain
why Sweden under a new liberal-conservative gov-
ernment has now embarked on a path of labour
market reforms not too different from the earlier
Danish ones. 
What are the policy lessons for other European
countries? It is certainly not that macroeconomic
performance can be improved without market-lib-
eral reforms. On the contrary, other Continental
EU countries would be well advised to reduce their
product market regulations to the Scandinavian
level and beyond. They would also be well-advised
to strengthen work incentives by reducing unem-
ployment benefit replacement rates and increasing
the requirements on the non-employed. The
Scandinavian experiences offer two main insights
here. 
• The first is that measured labour market reform
can produce substantial employment gains, while




different from the Anglo-Saxon one. Such reform
may be required to reduce unemployment once it
has risen, even if low unemployment could for-
merly be sustained with more generous welfare
provisions.
• The second insight is that reforms should be broad,
that is encompass all social insurance systems, to
reduce the risk that reduced benefit generosity in
one insurance system only results in an overflow of
benefit recipients to other systems.
The Scandinavian experiences also illustrate the “ben-
efits” of having a deep crisis. Denmark, Finland and
Sweden all underwent grave fiscal crises in the 1980s
or early 1990s. These crises helped form a consensus
on the need for sustained fiscal discipline, which has
been conducive to fiscal consolidation and pension
reform. An important characteristic of the “Scandi-
navian miracle” may simply be that sharp crises 
– conflicting with generally held perceptions of the
superiority of the own model – offer a more fertile soil
for policy change than a creeping crisis (as in France
and Germany) or a continuous crisis (as in Italy). The
most important policy changes may not necessarily be
radical reforms of institutions but rather curbing the
excesses that tend to accumulate over time in any sys-
tem. The Scandinavian experiences highlight the
importance of building a consensus on such measured
reform.
Chapter 5: Tax competition
Tax competition seems to be taking place in the EU,
as member states compete with each other for mobile
capital and profit. In particular, corporation tax rates
have fallen significantly in the last decade. There is
evidence that this has been partly fuelled by more
aggressive competition from the EU10, which have
substantially lower rates than the EU15.
Surprisingly, corporation tax revenues have held up
remarkably well, though there are two different
forces at work here. First, aggregate tax revenues
have remained high, probably due to higher rates of
profit, than in the past. But second, there is evidence
that countries that are able to maintain a relatively
low tax rate are attractive locations for both capital
and profit; hence these countries can generate sub-
stantial revenues partly at the expense of other coun-
tries. Flows of both capital and profits appear to be
highly sensitive to differences in tax rates among
countries. 
However, continued downward pressure on tax rates
must ultimately also depress aggregate revenues. This
process of competition raises four questions:
• Does it matter? 
• Is it fair?
• Should there be a coordinated response? 
• How should individual governments react? 
The setting of corporation taxes
Broadly, economic theory suggests that an individual
country tends to lose out by taxing the return to cap-
ital located in that country. The reason is that,
because capital is mobile, its owners will shift their
capital to jurisdictions where they earn the best post-
tax rate of return. As a result, any taxes levied on
capital located in an individual country tend to
increase the required pre-tax rate of return there,
leaving the post-tax rate of return largely unaffected.
This occurs through a process of shifting capital else-
where, which results in a lower level of economic
activity and hence lower overall income for the resi-
dents of that country. In addition, the effective bur-
den of the tax is in any case passed on to domestic
residents; the owners of the capital do not bear the
burden since they continue to receive the same post-
tax rate of return. 
That suggests that individual countries should not tax
the income on capital located within their jurisdic-
tions. This statement has to be qualified, however,
insofar as capital needs public infrastructure in order
to operate efficiently. Indeed, it is efficient from a sin-
gle country’s perspective to impose a tax on mobile
capital equal to the marginal congestion cost (or
reduction in the user quality of the infrastructure)
that this capital incurs. Thus a capital income tax that
has the character of a user fee for the public infra-
structure is likely to survive a process of intense tax
competition. 
In practice, though, governments typically try to tax
capital at higher rates than this implies. One reason
may be an apparent aim of equity as well as effi-
ciency. A tax on capital income may give the appear-
ance of taxing owners of capital, even if economic
theory suggests that the tax does not make them any
worse off. Further, EU governments raise two to
three percent of GDP from corporation taxes; in
practice they are reluctant to forgo such a stream of
income.Since EU member states retain the right to set their
own tax rates, it is hard to describe the setting of low
tax rates as unfair, even if this causes flows of capi-
tal or profit from other countries. This may seem
unfair, as the new EU member states with the lowest
tax rates are also recipients of grants from the rest of
the EU. However, low taxes and grants can be seen as
serving the same end: they both attract capital and
ultimately reduce the dispersion in standards of liv-
ing across the EU. So, if one accepts the idea of EU
grants to these countries, one should also accept that
they impose lower corporation taxes than the old EU
states.
A coordinated response within the EU may slow the
rate of decline of corporation tax rates but would not
end competition. One important reason is simply that
there are many countries outside the EU who would
not be part of an agreed structure. In any case, coor-
dination would have to encompass the definition of
the tax base as well as the tax rate; this would be
extremely complex.
The advantage of destination-based taxation 
So is there any useful policy available to individual
governments? One possible route is to consider where
the return to capital is taxed. The bulk of taxes on
corporate profit are levied on a source basis – where
the economic activity (for example, production or the
head office of multinationals) is located. Such taxes
tend to drive that economic activity away, and hence
lead to tax competition. 
There are two alternatives. A residence-based tax
could in principle be introduced on the worldwide
income either at the level of the head office of a multi-
national corporation or on its ultimate shareholders.
But the former would not solve the problem of tax
competition, since head offices themselves are also
mobile. The latter is simply not practical; it would
require a shareholder individual to be taxed on his
share of the retained profit of a non-resident compa-
ny that may have no economic activity in the share-
holder’s country. Since the income is not remitted to,
and hence not observed by, the shareholder’s home
country, a tax on it would be impossible to enforce. A
capital gains tax based on the valuation of assets held
abroad would generate problems of valuation, and
also possibly problems of liquidity if introduced on
an annual basis. 
A more radical idea is a destination-based tax, levied
where consumers buy goods and services. If such a tax
could be introduced, it would avoid distorting the
location of economic productive activity since that
would be irrelevant for ultimate tax liabilities. Instead,
only the location in which a good or service was pur-
chased would affect tax liabilities. Such a tax would
also make intra-company financing and trading irrel-
evant for tax purposes; only the sale to a final con-
sumer would affect the ultimate tax liability. This
would make it much harder for multinational corpo-
rations to shift profits between countries. If individual
consumers were relatively immobile, competition
would be largely avoided.
In fact, introducing a destination-based tax is not as
difficult as it might seem, since such a tax almost
exists already. VAT is a destination-based tax on
value added, and value added is equal to the sum of
economic profit and labour income. It would be pos-
sible to levy a destination-based tax only on econom-
ic profit by increasing the rate of VAT, and making
an offsetting reduction in taxes on labour income.
Such a tax would be in the interest of an individual
country to introduce on its own, since it would tend
to attract activity from countries with source-based
taxes. And if all countries used such a tax, then tax
competition for capital and profit would be largely
eliminated.
Chapter 6: Economic nationalism
The Treaty of Rome and subsequent EU treaties insist
on the principle that national governments should not
discriminate against residents of other member states.
Economists claim that such a principle buttresses effi-
ciency; it is inefficient, for example, to favour a
national firm in public procurement if a foreign firm
can supply the same good at a lower cost. 
Yet, we have observed in recent years a number of
incidents where individual countries have pursued
nationalistic economic policies in a discretionary
and selective way despite their pledge. Governments
have intervened in financial markets so as to block
or modify cross-border mergers involving promi-
nent domestic firms. Attempts to subsidise national
champions or to recapitalise and bail out national
losers are still common. Such interventions may
take several forms: influencing the location of
firms, influencing control, political intervention to
obtain contracts, state aid, state ownership, influ-





The consequences of economic nationalism
Economic nationalism typically benefits private inter-
est groups, often at the expense of consumers.
Politicians can derive substantial private rents from
nationalistic policies. These rents may be obtained in
several ways: 
• Buying the support of a political clientele in order
to be re-elected. 
• Investing in symbolic, visible projects in order to
enhance one’s own prestige.
• Distributing favours within networks of friends
(“crony capitalism”). 
• The revolving door (securing comfortable fallback
positions in large firms for politicians).
• Undercover finance of political parties in exchange
for favours.
But economic nationalism may also benefit national
residents as a whole, at the expense of foreign resi-
dents. The main underlying mechanism is the transfer
effect, by which national residents benefit from the
monopoly rents earned abroad by national firms,
while not suffering as consumers. As a result, voters in
each country may actually support policies that
increase these rents, while aggregate decision-making
at a higher level (say the EU) would take into account
the welfare of foreign consumers and try to block
these policies. 
The costs imposed by economic nationalism have sev-
eral dimensions. The most salient ones are associated
with direct control/ownership of commercial firms
and/or state aid to these firms. One can cite: 
• Lack of market discipline and poor corporate gover-
nance. A firm that receives state aid has little inter-
est in cutting costs and improving product quality,
as losses are expected to be offset by the govern-
ment. The firm’s managers will have little incentive
to rationalise production, to recruit workers ade-
quately, to resist pressure for wage increases, and
to innovate.
• Productive inefficiency at the firm level. Locational,
technology and product choices are influenced by
political considerations rather than economic effi-
ciency.
• Distortions in competition. Government-support-
ed firms can better stand losses as they expect to
be bailed out by taxpayers. These firms are given
a “deep pocket” from which to claim resources,
which allows them a lower cost of capital and
thus the possibility to undercut their rivals even
though these rivals may be more efficient.
Government-supported firms may also have bet-
ter access to public infrastructure (airport slots,
mail delivery etc.) and an edge in procurement
contests. 
• Coordination failures. The potential benefits of
nationalism for a country are offset by the nation-
alistic policies of competing countries, while its
costs in terms of distortions usually remain.
Despite the recent surge in economic nationalism, it is
not clear how much of an actual bearing it has on the
economy. Powerful counter forces exist. European
Single Market rules make many nationalistic inter-
ventions illegal or subject to the approval of the
European Commission. Business interests lobby
actively against policies that meddle with their own
managerial decisions. Cross-border merger activity is
gathering pace in Europe. 2005 and 2006 witnessed
several large value mergers or acquisitions. Economic
nationalism may claim some victories in the short
term but most likely will be defeated in the long term.
This is because of the pressure from Brussels, because
of the discipline imposed by international capital
markets, and because of the fact that countries may
fear retaliation if they shut their borders to cross-bor-
der mergers.
Policies to fight economic nationalism
The Commission and the wider public must keep an
open eye on the dangers of economic nationalism.
The tools of European competition policy are lim-
ited because of the different regulatory and owner-
ship structures in different countries. European
competition policy can control state aid and may be
effective in checking support to national champi-
ons, but still cannot overcome regulatory barriers
or limit the activities of state-owned firms except
under the competition statutes. We propose the fol-
lowing:
1. Regulatory asymmetries should be overcome by
harmonisation of regulation, coordination of
regulators and the establishment of European
regulators. In energy markets, for example, the
unbundling of transmission (high-tension grid)
and transport (pipelines) should be considered
because they are a natural monopoly and the
control of these bottlenecks by vertically inte-
grated firms has high exclusionary potential.
Interconnection capacity across boundariesshould be managed at the European level since
firms and national regulators may not have the
right incentives to provide interconnection capac-
ity across countries. In general, a European sys-
tem of regulators may be a commitment device to
avoid opportunism and resist political pressure.
A step in the right direction is the recent move to
limit the leeway of central banks and national
regulators to block foreign takeovers in the bank-
ing sector. 
2. A debate should be opened about introducing a
European rule that would severely restrict indefi-
nite public ownership of corporations – even if it
is only partial. Publicly owned firms distort the
market for corporate control with severe adverse
effects on industry restructuring as a consequence.
Public ownership also introduces severe conflicts
of interest for governments. Our proposal to radi-
cally restrict public ownership in competitive envi-
ronments would go a long way toward eliminating
the incentives for harmful nationalistic interven-
tion. Most of the remaining public ownership
today is a remnant of the past that has persisted
for no good economic reason. 
3. Entry barriers in different EU countries should
be lifted simultaneously to avoid the strategic
gaming and positioning of large firms and coun-
tries that follows from asymmetries in the dereg-
ulation process. A country that liberalises earlier
than others puts the consumer first, but may give
away opportunities for its firms to consolidate
their positions and later expand in the deregulat-
ed markets in other countries. Coordinated de-
regulation across the EU may therefore be a nec-
essary prerequisite for countries to deregulate
sufficiently. 
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